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Executive Summary
To date, action to control mercenaries and private military and security companies has been
ad hoc and sporadic. While most countries recognise the need to prohibit the activities of
mercenaries, few have developed relevant laws to support the international agreement that
exists. The more complicated matter of private military and security companies has been left
largely to self-regulation and corporate responsibility, with only a few countries (e.g. South
Africa and the United States) developing and implementing specific laws on this issue. There
is an urgent need for States to take steps to control not only the role of these actors in the
arms trade but also their provision of military and security services. An interlocking framework
of national, regional and international control mechanisms is required. Key priorities for States
for the development of such a framework include: 
l Ratification of relevant international and regional legal instruments.
l Introduction of controls over arms brokering and shipping agents that recognise the role
played by private military and security companies;
l Development of national legislation to control the activities of private providers of military
and security services;
l Better and more rigorous implementation of UN arms embargoes and sanctions, which
include in their scope military and security services and technical assistance that may
accompany arms transfers;
l Support for the continuation and broadening of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur 
on mercenaries to include private military and security companies; and
l Promotion of security sector reform programmes that lead to the development of
accountable security forces with proper civilian oversight and control so as to reduce the
need for the use of private military and security companies and support efforts to combat
the illicit trade in small arms. 
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Executive Summary
The 1990s witnessed a change in the way wars were fought as the amount of available
weaponry increased and the types of actors engaged in warfare multiplied. The opening up 
of the international arms trade, in particular with new buyers and more channels of supply,
has raised concerns about who purchases weapons and for what use. Afeature of this
changing nature of conflict has been the continuing, if not growing, presence of mercenaries
and the emergence of private companies contracted to provide military and security services.
These range from logistical support and training to advice and procurement of arms and
on-the-ground intervention. This briefing highlights how the activities of mercenaries and
private military and security companies can contribute to small arms proliferation and misuse
and examines steps the international community can take at the UN Small Arms Conference
and elsewhere to effectively combat mercenarism and regulate the activities of private military
and security companies. 
The role played by these companies relates not only to provisions contained in the contracts
they sign with their clients to provide large amounts of weaponry, but also how the military and
security services and training that they provide contributes to the demand for weapons in the
regions where they operate. There are a number of ways in which mercenaries and private
military and security companies are involved in small arms proliferation. These include:
l Arms brokering and transportation activities
l Violations of UN arms embargoes
l Impact on human rights and humanitarian law
l Driving demand for small arms
Various measures already exist to ban the activities of mercenaries and regulate some of the
activities of private military and security companies either through national legislation or
international agreements. However, there is concern these efforts are neither comprehensive
nor accepted widely enough to effectively control the activities of mercenaries and private
military and security companies.
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Private Military and Security Companies 
and Small Arms Proliferation
The range of activities and services encompassed by these three groups include:
l combat and operational support
l military advice and training
l arms procurement
l intelligence gathering
l security and crime prevention services
l logistical support
There are differences between mercenaries, PMCs and PSCs, specifically in the services
they provide and the activities in which they engage, as well as their target clients, which may
be governments, multinational corporations or humanitarian agencies. Generally speaking,
most PMCs have refrained from signing contracts with non-State armed actors (stating that
they will only work for internationally-recognised governments) although the fact that there
are few legal safeguards to prevent them doing so is a cause for concern. Private security
companies are usually used by multinational or national companies or by humanitarian
agencies in situations of conflict or instability. Mercenaries on the other hand have been
defined historically and in international law by the threat they pose to the political integrity and
constitutional order of States by fighting alongside rebel groups. However, it must be
recognised that there are areas of overlap between these groups of actors, in particular when
PMCs hire mercenaries or where certain companies provide ‘dual services’ including both
defensive security and offensive military capabilities. This briefing focuses primarily on the
role of PMCs and PSCs in small arms proliferation, although the role of mercenaries, whose
activities are less understood, is also considered.
There are a number of factors that have contributed to the privatisation of security and the
outsourcing of military and security services. The end of the Cold War reduced the need for
large standing armies and led to the demobilisation of tens of thousands of highly professional
soldiers across Europe, North America and parts of Africa. Some of these soldiers have
established or have turned to employment with private military and security companies or
have become freelance mercenaries. The close of the Cold War has also left a power vacuum
in certain regions and countries affected by conflict which has in places been filled by private
military and security companies that have been hired by warring factions. Another factor has
been the opening up of the international arms trade to an increasing number of buyers and
sellers, which has allowed a broader number of different actors with the necessary resources
to access weaponry, not least of which are the small arms and light weapons often used in
direct combat. In the past these weapons moved through legal and/or illegal channels, but
predominantly to government end-users. Although there are concerns about the misuse of
arms by State forces, the proliferation of non-government end-users and lack of adequate
governmental control has increased the use of arms to fuel conflicts and to facilitate human
rights abuses and breaches of international humanitarian law. Finally, globalisation and the
integration of the global market driven by electronic financial transactions and highly mobile
and accessible communication equipment has eased the means by which transnational
organised criminal groups have been able to circumvent controls and exploit States with weak
regulation or porous borders to conduct criminal activity, including the smuggling of weapons. 
Factors in the
privatisation
of security
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Private Military and Security Companies 
and Small Arms Proliferation
The 1990s witnessed a change in the way wars are fought as the amount of available
weaponry increased and the types of actors engaged in warfare multiplied. The opening up
of the international arms trade, in particular, with new buyers and more channels of supply
has raised concerns about who purchases weapons and for what use. A feature of this
changing nature of conflict has been the continuing, if not growing, presence of mercenaries
and the emergence of private companies, contracted to provide military and security
services, ranging from logistical support and training to advice, procurement of arms and
o n-the-ground intervention. There is a strong rationale that as the international community
moves to consider how to regulate the activities of the actors involved in the international
arms trade, such as arms brokers or arms transportation agents, the activities of private
military and security companies should also become an area of attention and control. 
The focus of this briefing is on how the activities of mercenaries and private military and
security companies can contribute to small arms proliferation and misuse and what steps
could be taken to address their role at the UN Small Arms Conference. The role played by
private military and security companies relates not only to provisions contained in the
contracts they sign with their clients to provide large amounts of weaponry, but also how the
military and security services and training that they provide contributes to the demand for
weapons in the regions where they operate. In this way private military and security
companies contribute to the negative impact small arms proliferation can have on conflict
transformation, human rights and humanitarian law, as well as post-conflict stability and
development. While generally not considered a central issue for the UN Small Arms
Conference, a recently organised expert meeting on mercenaries by the Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights called for addressing the issues linking mercenaries – in
whatever form – and arms trafficking.1 This briefing makes key recommendations for how the
issue could be tackled and loopholes closed in existing legislation. The regulation of military
and security services that often accompany weapons sales is an emerging issue that should
be addressed in the follow-up to the Conference and through other fora.
Three terms are often used interchangeably in the debate on the privatisation of security:
mercenaries, private military companies and private security companies. In simple terms,
they can be defined as:
l mercenaries – individuals who fight for financial gain in foreign conflicts that are primarily
used by non-State armed groups and more occasionally by governments; 
l private military companies (PMCs) – corporate entities providing offensive services
designed to have a military impact in a given situation that are generally contracted by
governments; and
l private security companies (PSCs) – corporate entities providing defensive services to
protect individuals and property, frequently used by multinational companies in the extractive
sector, humanitarian agencies and individuals in situations of conflict or instability.
Introduction
Definitions
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Existing Efforts to Control Mercenaries 
and Private Military and Security Companies
Arms procurement and brokering of small arms and light weapons (SALW) are integral
aspects of the activities of mercenaries, private military companies and private security
companies. The links between these actors and the arms trade relates not only to their role
in obtaining or facilitating the purchase of weapons but also how the military and security
services and training that they provide contributes to the demand for, and misuse of, weapons
in the regions where they operate. The role played is complex and requires further research.
The connections between mercenaries and the illicit trafficking of small arms has been
identified by the UN, with the Special Rapporteur noting: 
“The many forms of criminal associations involving mercenaries include illicit arms
trafficking, which constitutes one of the illegal activities that causes the greatest harm
to mankind. Many armed conflicts occur because they have been provoked by arms
merchants and others are unnecessarily prolonged by them. The investigations
conducted by various United Nations bodies indicate that arms trafficking is the most
widespread form of illegal operation. In the Special Rapporteur’s view, the mercenary
component is usually present in illicit arms traffic operations. Mercenaries are hired as
pilots, co-pilots or flight engineers for the transport of weapons, as arms salesmen in
the field or as instructors in the use of the weapons and military material that have
been sold, and to train troops or paramilitary groups, which in many cases comprise
raw recruits, persons with little training or knowledge or ad hoc combatants.” 4 
There are a number of ways in which mercenaries and private military and security
companies are involved in small arms proliferation that need to be taken into consideration
at the UN Small Arms Conference. These and their consequences are listed below.
An important role played by private military and security companies in the spread and misuse
of small arms is when they perform arms brokering and transportation services (See box on
Papua New Guinea).5 Arms brokering and transport agents are individuals or companies that
act as intermediaries between suppliers of arms and recipients. Their involvement may range
from simply matching buyer and seller, to facilitating the entire transaction on behalf of the
purchaser, which in certain cases includes the transportation of arms. Research has shown
that arms brokering and transportation activities have resulted in weapons being channelled
to regions of conflict and human rights crisis zones. As such, the arms brokering issue has
become a major focus for concern at the UN Small Arms Conference.6
The role of
mercenaries,
PMCs and
PSCs in the
proliferation
and misuse of
small arms 
Arms
brokering and
transportation
activities 
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Private Military and Security Companies 
and Small Arms Proliferation
The international community has already responded to traditional mercenary activity by
developing international norms to prohibit it. In 1987, the UN Commission on Human Rights
appointed a Special Rapporteur on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human
rights and impeding of the right of peoples to self-determination, and in 1989 the UN adopted
an International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of
Mercenaries. The UN Special Rapporteur, however, whose role it is to report to the
Commission on Human Rights and General Assembly, has drawn attention to the numerous
gaps and ambiguities in the international legislation and the persistence of, and increase in,
mercenary activities.2 On the issue of private military and security companies the way forward
is not so straightforward. There are certain legitimate and acceptable roles for PMCs and
PSCs, acting in accordance with national and international law. However, there are situations
in which certain services performed by PMCs and PSCs have increased the amount of
weaponry in a region, prolonged or exacerbated conflict or facilitated human rights abuses. 
In his most recent report the Special Rapporteur noted:
“…While private companies play an important role in the area of security, there are
certain limits that should not be exceeded. They should not participate actively in
armed conflicts, nor recruit and hire mercenaries, much less attempt to replace the
State in defending national sovereignty, preserving the right of self-determination,
protecting external borders or maintaining public order.” 3
Of particular concern is the lack of accountability and absence of regulation in the private
provision of military and security services. Existing control lacunae are currently being
exploited by unscrupulous private actors. As the international community moves to adopt
greater norms of responsibility, accountability and control over the provision and use of small
arms and light weapons, it is important that governments ensure that similar controls are
extended towards the activities of PMCs and PSCs. 
The UN
response 
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Existing Efforts to Control Mercenaries 
and Private Military and Security Companies
The UN General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, and the
Commission on Human Rights have all condemned the use of mercenaries as undermining
the rights of peoples to self-determination and enjoyment of human rights. The UN Special
Rapporteur, moreover, has in his reports underlined the negative impacts that mercenaries
have on the protection of human rights.13 In his latest report, he says that:
“The work done by the Office of the Special Rapporteur since its creation makes it
abundantly clear that there is a direct relationship between mercenary activities and
the human rights of the peoples affected by the criminal activities of mercenaries
[…and] mercenaries also violate human rights by committing crimes, carrying out
executions, torture and other illegal acts referred to in international instruments.” 14
There have also been reports of private military and security companies being implicated 
or complicit in human rights abuses or breaches of international humanitarian law (see box
Colombia). For example, there is documented evidence of the South Africa company
Executive Outcomes being responsible for introducing indiscriminate weapons, such as fuel
air explosives, into Angola.15
It is estimated that during the last 10 years tens of thousands of people have been victims of politically
motivated killings during the conflict in Colombia between the government armed forces and paramilitary
organisations that operate with their support or acquiescence, and the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia) and ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional), both non-State armed
opposition groups.16
In October 1998 concerns arose about the activities of Defence Systems Colombia (DSC), a subsidiary
of the UK-based private security company, Defence Systems Limited (DSL).17 Defence Systems
Colombia was under contract by British Petroleum (BP) to run its security operations in Colombia, and,
until 1997, was also contracted by OCENSA– the consortium company which owned the pipeline from
the oil fields to the coast – of which BP is a partner along with other transnational oil companies.
According to information provided to the UK newspaper The Guardian18 the security strategy of
OCENSA/DSC may have directly or indirectly contributed to human rights violations against the civilian
population in Colombia. The security strategy reportedly relied heavily on paid informants whose
purpose was to covertly gather “intelligence information”. This intelligence information would then
reportedly be passed on by OCENSAto Colombian military officers who, with their private paramilitary
allies, were widely believed to have been responsible for numerous, “disappearances”, torture and
extra-judicial executions.
Furthermore, evidence emerged that in 1997 OCENSA/DSC purchased military equipment for the
Colombian army’s XIV Brigade, which had reportedly been involved in numerous human rights
violations. At the time that the equipment was purchased, via Silver Shadow, a private Israeli security
company, army personnel attached to the XIV Brigade were under investigation for complicity in the
massacre of 15 unarmed civilians in Segovia in April 1996.
Impact on 
human rights and
humanitarian law 
Colombia
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Existing Efforts to Control Mercenaries 
and Private Military and Security Companies
An example of a private military company involved in arms brokering and providing military services is
illustrated by the involvement of the UK company Sandline International in Papua New Guinea (PNG)
in 1997. The company had been hired by the PNG government in January 1997 to put down a
rebellion on the island of Bougainville and to import Russian arms. The military force was sub-contracted
from another PMC, Executive Outcomes (EO), and was composed of South African, British and
Ethiopian personnel.
As part of its contract, Sandline International procured four attack (Mi-24) and transport (Mi8/17)
helicopters (originating in Belarus), armoured fighting vehicles, light weapons, heat-seeking missiles,
electronic warfare equipment, communications systems, 500 cases of ammunition and explosives.
End-user certificates were provided by the PNG Defence Forces and were processed through a
London-based company that “brokered the sale of former Soviet surplus equipment purchased in
Belarus…for sale at high prices to governments of developing countries.” 7 The contract attracted
negative attention when it became clear that the PNG government was using $36 million in aid and
development funds from Australia to pay for the company’s services.8
The contract called for Sandline International to conduct offensive operations in Bougainville in
conjunction with the PNG Defence Forces (PNGDF) to render the [armed group] militarily ineffective
and repossess the Panguna mine. It soon became apparent that the political leaders in PNG had not
informed the military of their business interests in this operation9 and resistance to Sandline
International’s involvement began to develop from within the PNGDF. In revolt, the PNGDF staged
Operation “Rausim Kwik” (‘Remove Quickly’) under which the Army ‘detained’EO personnel. At the end
of March 1997, the 44 Sandline International employees were expelled and the contract was suspended.
Another area of concern relates to the operation of private military and security companies
in violation of UN or other regional arms embargoes. For example, in 1998 Sandline
International signed a contract with the then-exiled President of Sierra Leone, Ahmed Tejan
Kabbah, to supply a 35 tonne shipment of arms from Bulgaria which led to controversy about
whether this was in contravention of the UN arms embargo on the country at the time.10
While most arms embargoes do not cover military services, the UN Security Council sanctions
on Eritrea and Ethiopia in 2000 made such provisions. The resolution stated that “all states
should prevent the sale or supply to Eritrea and Ethiopia of arms and related material of all
types and the provision of technical assistance or training related to prohibited materials.” 11
However, due to the inadequate enforcement of arms embargoes by many countries, it is
difficult to ascertain whether or not these prohibitions have been followed, as noted by the
Security Council in its report of May 2001.12
Papua New Guinea 
Violations of
UN arms
embargoes 
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Developing an International Regulatory Framework
Various measures already exist to ban the activities of mercenaries and regulate some of the
activities of private military and security companies, either through national legislation or
international agreements. However, to date, these efforts have not been enough to effectively
control the activities of mercenaries and private military and security companies or to mitigate
the negative effects of their operations as they relate to the proliferation and misuse of SALW.
This includes the roles of these actors in arms brokering and the provision of military and
security services or equipment to governments or armed opposition groups who cannot
access these goods through regulated State-to-State channels. The regulation of private
security companies has received even less international attention. 
International Convention against the Recruitment, Use,
Financing, and Training of Mercenaries
This Convention, adopted by the UN in 1989, is the only international instrument solely
applicable to controlling the activities of mercenaries. (Mercenaries are included in the
Geneva Conventions but only for the purposes of defining them in international humanitarian
law). It does not impose a total ban on mercenarism, only on those activities aimed at
overthrowing or undermining the constitutional order and territorial integrity of a State. 
To enter into force the Convention must be ratified by 22 UN Member States, but to date only
21 States have done so.24 The activities of private military and security companies are not
seen as falling within the scope of the Convention. 
UN Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of
and Trafficking in Firearms Ammunition and other
Related Materials
The UN Firearms Protocol, as part of the Convention on Transnational Organised Crime, 
is one of the newest international agreements25 and one which could encompass some of the
activities described in the previous section. In the preamble, the Protocol reaffirms that States
should give high priority to combating illicit trafficking because of “the links of such activities
with drug trafficking, terrorism, transnational organised crime and mercenary and criminal
activities.” The Protocol therefore recognises the important link between individuals or
companies providing military services that are also involved in illicit arms trafficking. The
parent Convention defines transnational organised crime as any “structured group of three or
more persons existing for a period of time and having the aim of committing serious crime in
order to, directly or indirectly, obtain a financial or other material benefit” and so can be read
in particular instances to cover mercenaries and PMCs/PSCs within its remit. 
Existing
controls 
International 
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Existing Efforts to Control Mercenaries 
and Private Military and Security Companies
The services provided by private security and military companies, including direct combat
duties and military training, may be a factor in the demand for SALW in the regions where such
companies have operated (see box on Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina). In this way, such
companies can present a risk, contributing to the militarisation of society and the exacerbation
of tensions in a region. There have also been problems with stockpiles of surplus weapons
that private military and security companies have left behind once their contracts have finished.
The lack of accountability in this area is proving a serious issue for concern. The existence of
uncontrolled pools of weapons (left behind by PMCs after operations) can undermine efforts
to sustain peace and foster development once conflict has ceased. 
During the 1992-1995 cease-fire between Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the United
States (US) government responded to requests from the Croatian government to provide training to
the Croat Army. In late 1994, Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), a US company,
was contracted by the Croat government as a component of a larger “Democracy Transition
Assistance Programme.” Under US regulations, MPRI had to obtain a licence and authorisation from
the US State Department’s Office of Defence Trade Controls to be allowed to provide such services. 
Although the contract was for non-strategic training, concerns surfaced that it could be leading to a
militarisation of the region. It was reported, for example, that Croatia was spending more than
US$1 billion to purchase equipment and weapons for itself – drawn largely from Eastern European
merchants and in violation of the UN embargo – to complement the training it was receiving.19
Furthermore it has been debated whether or not MPRI’s training of the Croatian army could have
worsened human rights violations committed by it during a subsequent offensive in Krajina against
Serb forces.20
In 1996, MPRI was also selected by the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina to train its new armed
forces. The ‘Train and Equip’programme established by MPRI was to “assist the Army of the
Federation in becoming a self-sufficient and fully operable force capable of providing security for the
Federation and stability for the region.” 21 The company was granted a contract reportedly worth
US$40 million, paid for largely by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Brunei and Malaysia. Such training was to be
alongside the provision of military hardware (almost US$100 million worth of surplus US military
equipment) by the US government to the Federation Army with MPRI’s job being to provide training
for how this should be used.
It is unlikely that MPRI provided anything more than “democracy-transition” training to the Federation
Army.22 However, for many observers the training did not increase security and stability in the Balkans
but rather contributed to a more volatile situation. Former UN Representative to Bosnia, Carl Bildt, has
stated that ‘Train and Equip’could start an arms race… It is inflaming a situation which is already
inflammatory. That’s not what it was originally designed to do.”23
Driving
demand for
small arms 
Croatia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina
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Developing an International Regulatory Framework
South Africa
The 1998 South African Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act is the most far-reaching
national legislation dealing with mercenaries and private military companies. Mercenary activity
is banned under the Act, however, its wider purpose is to regulate foreign military assistance,
defined as including: “advice and training; personnel, financial, logistical, intelligence and
operational support; personnel recruitment; medical or paramedical services, or procurement
of equipment.” The rendering of foreign military assistance is not proscribed under the Act but
instead controlled by a licensing and authorisation procedure under the competence of the
National Conventional Arms Control Committee. The Act includes extra-territorial application
and punitive powers for those that do not abide by it. However, to date it has been enforced
only to a limited degree and controversy has surrounded its practical application.
The United States
In the US, controls over arms brokering and the export of military services are dealt with in a
similar way,26 through the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), overseen by the
Department of State’s Office of Defence Trade Controls.27 The regulations cover the activities
of private military contractors since it applies to the US Munitions Lists, which include military
training and other services. Under the regulations, registered companies must apply for a
license if intending to engage in brokering activities or providing military services. The licensing
process involves various offices within the State Department and regionally with controversial
cases referred to the Assistant Secretary of State.28 Once a contract has been signed
between a company and a foreign government, the US State Department continues to
monitor and regulate the flow of assistance and weapons, while US Customs enforce the
regulation. However, there are few provisions for information to be provided to Congress.
This lack of transparency and controversial use of military contractors by the US government
has been highlighted in the military aid package to Colombia, Plan Colombia. 
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Developing an International Regulatory Framework
The OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries
in Africa
The seemingly uncontrollable spread of mercenaries in Africa in the 1960s and 1970s led
governments in the region to try to limit their activities. In 1977 the Member States of the
Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU) signed the Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries
in Africa which came into force in 1985, making it the only enforceable international legal
instrument on mercenaries. The OAU Convention does not suffer from all of the same pitfalls
as the International Convention, since it uses a different definition of mercenarism. However,
its scope is also restricted to acts aimed at overthrowing recognised governments or
undermining a State’s territorial integrity and does not include private military and security
companies. Alack of resources, legal capacity and political will in many African States has
also meant that the Convention has seldom been implemented and enforced. 
Very few countries have legislation which bans mercenaries and supports, reinforces and
implements at the national level the International and OAU Conventions. 
Only a handful include military services in the scope of their national regulations on arms
exports or have adequate laws to regulate private military and security companies operating
out of their territory. South Africa and the United States have perhaps the most advanced
national legislation, while the UK is considering steps it could take. However, closer inspection
shows that even these measures are not totally adequate or effective.
United Kingdom
The Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870 is the only UK law specifically relevant to mercenaries
and private military and security companies. This law prohibits British subjects from becoming
mercenaries and recruiting others to do so, but there are doubts about its applicability in
modern circumstances. For example, it defines the offence of leaving the UK to enlist as a
mercenary by reference only to departure by ship, so that leaving by air would not be unlawful.
The last case where a person was tried under this law dates back to 1896. However, prompted
by the 1998 “arms to Africa affair” the UK government has said that it is considering options
for updating these regulations and in April 1999 the then Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook,
announced that the government would produce a Green (consultation) paper on the issue by
the end of 2000. This is still to be published.
In the UK, the only existing controls over arms brokering stem from powers given to the
Government under the United Nations Act of 1946. In June 2001, the Government published
plans for the regulation of brokering and trafficking in arms by UK persons through a registration
and licensing system. The further development of proposals to include restrictions on
technical assistance in areas covered by a UN or EU embargo is being actively considered.
This may include some, but not all private military activities, the remainder of which should
form part of the proposed Green paper. 
Regional 
National 
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Developing an International Regulatory Framework
l Promote measures to ensure that employers of private military and security companies
introduce sufficient safeguards to prevent breaches of human rights standards,
international humanitarian law, and other relevant aspects of international law by PMC 
or PSC personnel. Private security companies should not employ individuals credibly
implicated in human rights abuses and there should be strictly enforced controls governing
when force and firearms can be used. These controls should be in accordance with
international standards on the use of force, including the UN Code of Conduct for Law
Enforcement Officials and the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by
Law Enforcement Officials. All personnel should be properly trained in and committed to
respect for such standards; and
l Promote security sector reform programmes that lead to the development of accountable
security forces with proper civilian oversight and control so as to reduce the need for the
use of private military and security companies and support efforts to combat the illicit trade
in small arms. 
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Developing an International Regulatory Framework
To date, action to control mercenaries and private military and security companies has been
ad hoc and sporadic. While most countries recognise the need to prohibit the activities of
mercenaries, few have developed relevant laws to support the international agreement that
exists. The more complicated matter of private military and security companies has been left
largely to self-regulation and corporate responsibility, with only a few countries developing and
implementing specific laws on this issue. This briefing has highlighted the urgent need and
responsibility of States to take steps to control not only the role of these actors in the arms
trade but also their provision of military and security services. The inadequate regulation of
such services can have serious consequences for peace and security. An interlocking
framework of national, regional and international control mechanisms is required. Key
priorities for States include the need to:
l Ratify the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of
Mercenaries so that it enters into force and seek to negotiate a protocol to the instrument to
regulate the activities of private military and security companies;
l Enforce the OAU Convention on the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa and seek its
amendment to include private military and security companies;
l Ratify the UN Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms,
Ammunition and other Related Materials;
l Introduce controls over arms brokering and shipping agents into the scope of arms export
controls that recognise the role played by private military and security companies;
l Introduce national legislation to control the activities of private providers of military and
security services who should be required to register and apply for authorisation for each
contract they enter into. Such applications should be assessed in accordance with publicly
available criteria based on international human rights standards and humanitarian law;
l Implement and more rigorously enforce UN arms embargoes and sanctions, which include
in their scope military and security services and technical assistance that may accompany
arms transfers;
l Support the continuation and broadening of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on
mercenaries to include private military and security companies;
l Take steps to incorporate technical assistance and military and security services into all
national, regional and international arms export controls regimes;
l Develop international measures to share information on private military and 
security companies;
l Introduce and promote common standards for the regulation of private military and security
companies within the UN and regional bodies such as the OSCE, OAS, OAU and EU;
Developing
international
action 
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Conclusion
The UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects
and its follow-up provisions provide an important opportunity to reinforce, co-ordinate and
strengthen international efforts to address the problems associated with illicit trafficking and
the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons. By addressing the potential role
of mercenaries and private military and security companies in the illicit trade in small arms
and light weapons, and by taking strides to incorporate military and security services within
the scope of arms export controls, the international community can augment its efforts to
combat the problems associated with these weapons. At the same time this would represent
an important step towards greater regulation of private military and security companies which
is an emerging priority for the international community.
While not a prime focus of the UN Small Arms Conference, a recognition of the different
actors, such as private military and security companies, involved in the international arms
trade, and the range of activities which can impact on the proliferation and misuse of SALW
will build momentum for other fora to take steps to address the issue.
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